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NOTES
MUNICIPAL LIABILITIES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES
RECEIVED ON ITS STREETS.
The English rule regarding nunicipal liability is that when
a duty is imposed upon a municipal corporation for the bene-
fit of the public, without any consideration or emolument re-
ceived by the corporation it is not liable to a person who has
thereby been injured. It is only when the duty is a new one,
and is such as is ordinarily performed by trading corporations,
that an intention to give a private action for a neglect in its
performance is to be presumed. This rule is understood to
mean, regarding public highways, that because the highway is
to be repaired by the public, the common law does not make an
injury, arising from neglect to repair, a subject of private
action, but only of indictment by the government.'
The rule regarding the common law liability of municipal
corporations has found its lodgment in some jurisdictions of
the United States which hold, that in the absence of statutes,
the duty of a municipal coxporation in regard to its streets is
governmental and that it is not liable to an individual injured
by its failure .to keep them in repair. This holding is strictly
with the common law rule, that there is no liability on the part
of a municipal corporation for injuries received on its streets.2
Other jurisdictions create a municipal liability regarding
1 Quod nato -per Hed on, 5 E. IV. 3. "If there be a common way, and
it is not repaired, so that I am damaged by the miring of my horse. I
shall not have any action for that against those who ought to repair the
way, but it is-a proper action, in which case no individual shall have
an action on the case, but it is an aetion by way of presentment."
Further see Williams Case, 5 Rep. 72, Gibson v. Mayor of Preston, 5
Q. B. 218, Bartlett v. Crozier, 17 Johns. 437.,
2Mower v. Inhabitants of Licester, 9 Mass. 247, Holds: No action
lies, at common law, against a town for damages sustained through the
defects of the highways in such town. Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344,
gives a complete analysis of the common law liability of municipal
corporations. Collier v. City of Ft. Smith, 73 Ark. 477, holding a city
Is not liable for injuries resulting from a failure of its servants to dis-
play danger signals at a point where a street which was being repair-
ed was obstructed by a barricade.
Also see Tranter v. City of Sacramento, 45 Cal. 36; Roberts v. City
of Detroit, 102 Mich. 64; Carter v. City of Rahway, 55 N. J. 177;
Young v. City of Charleston, 20 S. C. 116; Town of Fishhill v. Fishhill
and B. Plankc Road Ca, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 634.
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streets by holding that the duty to maintain and repair streets
is a corporate duty and the municipality is iable for the neglect
thereof.
3
The doctrine of implied -liability is adopted by the great
weight of authority, that is, that where a municipal corporation
is vested with the authority to keep streets in repair, for the
neglect of this duty they are held hable for personal injuries
resulting.4
The legislative authority in some jurisdictions after impos-
ing upon the municipal corporation the authority to constract
and maintain streets, creates a liability by legislative enactment
for injuries received by individuals on their streets due to the
negligence of the municipality in fafling to keep them in proper
repadr.5  This duty imposed by the 'legislature has been con-
' Welter v. City of St. Paul, 40 Minn. 460, holds: That the city has
the care and control of the streets, and is charged with the duty and
has general authority to make improvements therein, and to construct
sewers and drains. These are corporate powers and duties, and it is
liable for its neglect, or the negligence of its officers, in the exercise
of such powers and the performance of such duties. Also see Denver
v. Dunsmore, 7 Colo. 328; Carson v. Genessee, 9 Ida. 244; Fritsch v.
Allegheny, 91 Pa. St. 226; Knoxville v. Bell, 12 Lea. (Tenn.) 157, and
Sutton v. Sonhomish, 11 Wash. 24.
4 Smoot v. Westumpha, 24 Ala. 116. By the court: "When a parti-
cular duty is positively enjoined and no discretion is vested in the cor-
poration as to whether it will or will not perform it and having the
means for performing this duty the corporation wilfully or negligently
fails to perform it, in consequence of which failure extraordinary
injury happens to an individual we see no reason why an action will
not lie as will against an individual for a similar omission of duty
that works an injury to another." Also see Albrittun v. Mayor and
Aldermen of Huntsville, 60 Ala. 486; Denver v. Williams, 12 Colo 475;
Lanson v. City of Grand Forks, 3 Dak. 307. Held, that where a city
had full control of its streets, and the improvement thereof, the power
being conferred by the legislature, it is incumbent upon it to keep them
in reasonably safe condition, and it will be liable for negligence in
failing so to do. City of Mt. Sterling v. Thomas, 60 IlL 264; Grover v.
City of Fort Wayne, 45 Ind. 429; Nacks v. Town of Whiting, 126 Iowa
405. Other states holding this rule are Kan., Md., Minn., Miss., Mo.,
Mont., Nebr., Nev., (N. Y. to limited extent), N. D., Okla, Oregon,
Tex., Va., Wash., W. Va.
Mass. Statute: Revised St. 25 sec. 1. All highways, townways,
causeways and bridges within the bounds of any town are required to
be kept in repair at the expense of such town, so that the same may be
safe and convenient for travellers, with their 'horses, teams and car-
riages, at all seasons of the year. Sec. 22: If any person shall receive
any injury in his person or property by reason of any defect or want of
repair, which has existed for the space of twenty-four hours in any
highway, he may recover compensation therefor. This section was
modified by the act of 1877 that the town had reasonable notice of the
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strued to mean that the municipality is to use due care to see
that its streets (including sidewalks) are reasonably safe for
persons exercising ordinary care and prudence.6
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR INJURIES RECEIVED ON
THE STREETS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
IN KENTUCKY.
The municipal liability in Kentucky is based upon an im-
plication resulting from the power given it by the legislative
authority to keep its streets in repair. The eases hold that
when the duty to keep streets in repair is devolved on a muni-
cipal corporation, and the power is conferred on it to raise
money for that purpose it is liable in a civil action for special
injuries resulting from neglect to perform tbis duty. That is
the corporation being vested with the authority by the legisla-
ture to keep its streets in repair is held liable for any personal
injuries resulting from its negligence or failure to do so.
The duty imposed upon a municipal corporation is to keep
its streets in a reasonably safe condition for pmblic travel by
persons exercising ordinary care for their own safety.8 The
municipality is not an insurer against injuries to persons using
its thoroughfares, and is not to be held liable in damages for
every injury that may befall a traveler who through thought-
lessness or negligence meets with some accident.9
defect, or might have had notice thereof by the exercise of proper care
and diligence, and that the defect could have been prevented by reason-
able care and diligence on the part of the town. The following states
have similar statutes: Vt., Conn., X. H., Me., and Mich.
Stanton v. City of Springfield, 12 Allen (Mass.) 566 and Mason
v. City of Boston, 14 Allen (Mass.) 508.
7 Town of Irvine v. Wagers, 9 Ky. L. R. 51; City of Henderson v.
White, 20 Ky. L. R. 1525; City of Covington v. Bryant, 70 Ky. 248;
Schmidt v. City of Newport, 184 Ky. 342.
C ity of Midway v. Floyd, 24 Ky. L. R. 1903. Held, that it was a
prejudicial error to instruct the jury that it was the duty of the city
to use ordinary care to keep its pavements "safe" for the use of pedes-
trians, as the duty of the city goes no further than to use such ordinary
care to keep its pavements in a reasonably safe condition for use. Also
see Town of Blsmere v. Tanner, 158 Ky. 681; City of Louisville v. John-
son, 24 Ky. L. R. 685; City of Louisville v. Arrowsnit, 145 Ky. 498
City of Louisville v. Hugh, 157 Ky. 643.
Schmidt v. City of Newport, 184 Ky. 342, held that a municipal-
ity is under the duty to exercise ordinary care to keep and maintain
its streets and pavements in a reasonably safe condition for travel, but
it is not an insurer of the safety of persons traveling therein. Also
see City of Ashland v. Bogg, 161 Ky. 728.
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A municipal corporation is oharged with negligence for the
ill repair of its streets when it has been brought to its notice,' 0
or when the street ,has been out of repair a sufficient length of
time that it is chargeable with knowledge that this condition
exists. 1  The question as to the notice of the municipality is
generally one for the jury.
12
The question as to when a street shall e improved is at the
discretion of the municipality and it is not liable merely be-
cause the street has not been improved.13 A city is only bound
to keep such streets and parts of streets in good repair as are
necessary for the convenience *f the traveling public: and as
streets are required for use they must be placed in a reasonably
safe. condition. 14  After a city has accepted and improved a
street it assumes the duty of maintaining it through its breadth
in a reasonably safe condition for travel.'6
A city cannot delegate its duty to keep a street in a reason-
ably safe condition so as to -avoid liability from injury result-
ing from the-defective condition of the street.'6 When material
for building purposes is allowed to be placed in the street if
the -city fmls to see that the traveling public is properly pro-
tected it may be held liable for parsonal injuries resulting from
10 Bell v. City of Henderson, 24 Ky. L. R. 2434; City of Henderson
v. Hchlamp. 14 Ky. L. R. 575; Canfield v. City of Newport, 24 Ky. L.
R. 2213. In this case some boys opened a manhole in the street one
forenoon and a barrel was immediately placed over it by a citizen.
This was removed at night by some unauthorized person, and before
daylight an accident was occasioned. Held, that in the absence of
actual notice, the city was not liable. City of Henderson v. White,
20 Ky. L. R. 1525. This case held that if a sidewalk was so out of
repair as to be unsafe, and the city had notice of its condition, or might
have known thereof by the use of ordinary diligence, and plaintiff
fell and injured herself by reason of that condition, the city Is liable.
11 City of Newport v. Miller, 93 Ky. 22. Where a stump intended
for a hitching post hed been standing for sixteen months without be-
ing provided with rings or in any way for use as a hitching post, the
period was sufficient to charge the 6ity with knowledge of its exist-
ence and character. Also see City of Henderson v. Reed, 23 Ky. L. R.
463; City of Bowling Green v. Duncan, 28 Ky. L. R. 1177; and City of
Louisville v. Brewer's Advir., 24 Ky. L. R. 1671.
12 Town of Bromley v. Bodkin, 25 Ky. L. R. 1245.
23Harney v. City of Lexington, 28 Ky. L. ] . 1177.
1" City of Henderson v. Sandefur and Co., 74 Ky. 550.
15 City of Maysville v. Guilfoyle, 110 Ky. 670.
21 In City of Louisville v. Arrowsmith, 145 Ky. 498. the court said:
"It is next urged that, as It Is the primary duty of the railway com-
pany (speaking of the street railway) to keep the 'streets between
and near its tracks In repair, the city should not be held liable, even
NOTES
-this negligence. When cities are improving streets and ma-
terial is placed in the street, reasonable care should be used
to avoid injuries therefrom.'5
Before a municipal corporation is answerable for damages
from injuries received from an alleged negligence due to the
ill repair of the street, the street must be opened by the city.19
When a city has graded one of its streets, and put in a curbing
and citizens have placed cinders therein for a walk, there is a
sufficient opening or taking charge of the street to render the
city liable for a defect in the sidewalk.20 When a sidewalk is
built at a place so dangerous that barriers should be erected to
prevent a false step or movement from causing injury, muni-
cipalities are under a duty to protect such places by lbarrier
or guards. 21 If a city permits -a citizen to construct a platform
over a gutter the same degree of care towards keeping it in a
safe condition for pedestrians is required as if the city had made
-the construction. 22 When citizens have been allowed to dig in
the sidewalk, municipalities are charged with the duty of see-
ing that this place ds properly protected. Municipalities,
however, are not answerable for damages received from shade
trees, lamp posts, hydrants or any other article placed upon
the street, as they are needed for the good and convenience of
the public; provided they are properly placed and construct-
ed.2
4
In City of Richmond v. Hill a recent case decided in June,
1922, reported in 195 Ky. 566, the question of municipal liability
though the accident resulted from a defective condition of the street
near or between the rails. If the question were one between the city
and the railway company, a consideration of this point would be en-
tered into; but as between the travelling public and the city. the duty
of the city to maintain its streets in a reasonably safe condition for pub-
lic travel is one which it cannot delegate to another so as to avoid lia-
bility from injury resulting from the defective condition."
"Elam v. City of Mt. Sterling, 132 Ky. 657. Held, that cities and
towns must keep their streets in reasonably safe condition for travel,
but in repairing a street they may place therein material, etc. properly
used In work, though reasonable care should be used to avoid injury
therefrom.
" Cochran v. Town of Shepherdsvile, 19 Ky. L. R. 1192; Ky. Stat..
sec. 2832
" City of Madisonville v. Pemberton's Admr., 25 Ky. L. R. 347.
= Town of Elsmere v. Tanner, 158 Ky. 681.
" Bell v. City of Henderson, 24 Ky. L. R. 2434.
1 Teager'v. City of Flemingsburg, 109 Ky. 746.
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was considered by the court. In this ease the plaintiff was in-
jured by a defective street crossing. It was shown that the
defect causing the injury had existed for several months. Held,
that the municipality was charged with the duty of exercising
ordinary care to keep and maintain its streets and pavements in
a reasonably safe condition. Regarding notice as to the defect,
the court held, that where a defect in a public street had exist-
ed for several months, knowledge of. such defect will be imputed
to the city.
G. W. M uT.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BANK AND
DEPOSITOR.
The relation between 'bank and .depositor is always based on
contract.' It is voluntarily assumed. A bank has a right to
select those with whom it will do business and its refusal to ac-
cept an account is not open to question.
2
Bank deposits may be divided into two classes; general and
special.8 The former are ;ep'osits generally to the credit of
the depositor and which may be drawn upon by him in the
usual course of the banking business. The latter are deposits
for safe-keeping to be returned intact on demand, or for some
specific purpose not contemplating a credit on one's general
account; 4 as for instance, money left with a bank to be paid tb
a certain person upon 'his delivery to the bank of a deed convey-
ing a tract of land to the depositor.5
The relation between a bank and a general depositor is that
of debtor and creditor.6 The money, check, dmaft, or promis-
sory note deposited becomes the property of the bank There
is no bailment or trust relationship: established in such a case.
The depositor is given credit for the amount deposited and pay-
ments made on his checks are charged to this account. The
Bagre v. Weil, 94 Ala. 466. 10 So. 546.
2 Second National Bank of Washington v. Averell, 2 App. Cas. (D.
C.) 470.
* Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank, 2 Wall. 256.
* Fogg v. TyZer, 109 Me. 109, 82 Atl. 1008.
5Kimmel v. Dickson, 58 N. W. 561.
6 Chamipon Ice Mfg. & Cold Storage Co. v. American Bonding &
Trust Go., 115 Ky. 863, 75 S. W. 197; Williame V. Rogers, 14 Bush
(KY.) 776
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bank has title -to the money deposited and can use it as it sees
fit. If it is stolen the bank is the loser. When a chack,
draft, or promissory note is indorsed in blank, and credit is
given to the depositor as for cash, the bank becomes the owner
of the instrument by virtue of the indorsement. In case it. is
not paid at maturity the bank 'has the usual remedies of in-
.dorsees of such instruments.7 The debt created by the deposit
is payable on demand and is subject at all times to the check
of the depositor to the extent of his deposit.8
However a different result is obtained in the ease of a special
deposit. The relation here is that of bailor and bailee.9 The
bank -has no authority to use the property and the depositor has
the right to receive -back the identical money or thing deposited.
When a check or draft drawn on another bank is deposited
without special agreement, it is deemed to 'be for collection only.
Although credit may be given to the depositor on the books
of the bank if it is returned dishonored the credit may be
cancelled and the instrument returned to the depositor. 10
The relationship here 'is that of principal and agent; not debtor
and creditor. However, when the bank receives such deposits as
money deposits and credits the depositor with so much money,
the t-itle to the instruments passes immediately to the bank and
its only rights against the depositor, in case they are not paid,
result from the relation of indorser -and indorsee."
When cheeks 'are deposited as checks the title to them re-
mains in the depositor and the bank acts as 'his agent for the
purpose of making the collection.' 2 But when there is an un-
derstanding that the check is accepted as cash, title passes to
the bank at once.13  Most of the cases on this point come up
when the check is indorsed in blank and deposited with no de-
finite understanding or agreement as to its status and the bank
gives the depositor credit in his pass 'book and on the books of
the bank for so much cash. We have in this situation two lines
of cases: one holding that prima facie the passing of the check
7Tyson v. Western National Bank. 77 Md. 412. 26 At. 520.
9 Elliott v. Capital City State Bank, 128 Iowa 275, 103 N. W. 777.
0 Alston v. State, 92 Ala. 124, 9 So. 732.
"National Cormmercial Bank v. Miller, 77 Ala. 168.
Aebi v. Bank of Evansville, 124 Wis. 73, 102 N. W. 329.
"Fayette National Bank v. Summers, 105 Va. 689, 54 S. E. 862.
sIbid.
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to the credit of the depositor, without an indorsement stating it
is for collection only, passes the title to -the bank ;14 the other
holds that prima facie the title remains in the depositor and
that something else, definitely indicating a contrary intention,
is necessary to pass title to the bank. However, neither rule is
held to be absolute, but is merely prima facie and* yields to the
intention of the parties.15 The question of intent is one of fact
to be determined by the jury.1
6
'When a check is offered for deposit to the bank drawn on
it by another customer and the bank accepts it and credifs the
depositor with the amount, this is similar to a payment of
money and if the depositor is acting in good faidli the bank can-
not later cancel the credit, upon discovery that the drawer had
insufficient funds to meet it.' 7 But if the depositor knew the
drawer did n t have sufficient funds in the bank to meet the
check, he is guilty of fraud if he presents the cheek for pay-
ment, and in that ease the bank can later cancel the credit.' s
The presentment for deposit'is a demand for payment and if
the bank credits the depositor without looking to see if the
drawer has sufficient funds, it cannot later repudiate the pay-
ment.
If one presents for deposit a forged check which he holds
in good faith, which purports to have been drawn on the bank
by another depositor, and the bank credits his -account with the
amount of the cheek and charges it to the supposed drawer, this
is in effect a payment and this credit cannot be cancelled upon
discovery that the drawer's name was forged.' 9
PEimmP T. PowE.,.
14 Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283.
In 're State Bank, 56 Minn. 119, 57 N. W. 336.
Fayette National Bank v. Summers, 105 Va. 689, 54 S. E. 862.
C0incinnati F irst National Bank v. Burkhardt, 100 U. S. 686.
's Peterson v. Union National Bank, 52 Pa. 206. 91 Am. Dec. 146.
Deposit Bank of Georgetown v. Fayette National Bank, 90 Ky.
10, 13 S. W. 339.
